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THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE
"DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION" EXCEPTION:
THE SLUGGISH RETREAT OF AN
ANCIENT IMMUNITY*
FLEMING JAMES, JR.-"'

The older pattern of governmental immunity is familiar., Almost no one contends that it is fully defensible, yet almost no one
contends that there should be compensation for all the ills that
result from governmental operations. No one, for instance, suggests that there should be liability for the injurious consequence
of political blunders such as the unwise imposition of tariff duties
or the premature lifting of OPA controls. As long, at least, as
liability is to be rested on fault there is a very good reason why the
courts should not inquire into such matters. Fault here would mean
an unreasonable mistake in legislative or executive action. The
separation of powers in our form of government and a decent regard by the judiciary for its co-ordinate branches should make
courts reluctant to sit in judgment on the wisdom or reasonableness
of legislative or executive political action. Moreover, courts are
not particularly well suited to pursue the examinations that would
be necessary to make this kind of judgment.
There is little doubt that if an American government were to
consent to tort liability by broad legislation the courts would nevertheless fashion exceptions to it because of this principle. American
courts will not review the wisdom of political decisions, or whether
executive discretion has been wisely exercised. For example, the
New York courts have declined to do so, though the New York
OThis article was delivered as a speech at the Institute on Torts and Procedure held March 7-8, 1957, by the College of Law of Florida Agricultural and
Mechanical University, Tallahassee, Florida.
0
1JB.A. 1925, LL.B. 1928, Yale University; joint author of CASES ON TRIALS,
JUDGMENTS AND APPEALS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, THE LAW OF TORTS, and
author of numerous articles in legal periodicals; Professor of Law, Yale University.
'See, in general, 2 HARPER and JAMES, TORTS c. XXIX (1956), and authorities
cited therein; see also Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L.
REv. 751 (1956).

[1841
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Court of Claims Act waives governmental immunity in sweeping
terms. 2

The Federal Tort Claims Act did not leave this limitation upon
governmental liability to be worked out by the courts. Congress
itself tried to formulate it, in section 2680 (a).3 The second and
most important provision of this section excludes liability for any
claim "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part
of a Federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused." This language clearly
excludes liability for the injurious consequences of decisions of
policy, or regulatory decisions, or quasi-judicial rulings, even if they
are mistaken or unreasonable. Perhaps this is as far as the provision was meant to go, for in sponsoring the act Assistant Attorney
would do no more than
General Shea told Congress that this section
4
the courts would probably do without it.
The courts have, however, construed this section as preserving
governmental immunity in many situations that are not legislative or regulatory or political in nature but in which discretion or
judgment is nevertheless involved. But discretion is a very broad
term. Even the manner of driving a nail or the speed of operating
a post-office truck involves choice and judgment and hence, in a
sense, discretion. No one has contended that the section preserves
immunity for all such acts. The actual contentions and decisions
have been based on interpretations that fall somewhat short of this.
Until recently the Government has tried to import into this
field a distinction between "uniquely governmental functions," on
the one hand, and activities that are the counterpart of those performed by private individuals, on the other. Immunity was claimed
for all conduct that constituted the "end-objective" of the particular governmental activity. This claim was grounded in part on the
implications of section 2680 (a). The theory, for example, would
exclude liability for negligence of Coast Guard personnel in maintaining a light to warn navigators of off-shore shoals, or for negli2E.g., Murrain v. Wilson Line, Inc., 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Ist
Dep't 1946), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 845, 72 N.E.2d 29 (1947); Goldstein v. State, 281 N.Y.
396, 24 N.E.2d 97 (1939).
328 U.S.C. §2680(a) (1952).
4Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judidary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.,

ser. 13, at 29 (1942).
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gence of the personnel in the control tower of an airport in giving
landing instructions to approaching planes. This governmentalproprietary dichotomy was upheld by some courts 5 until the Supreme
Court laid it finally to rest in 1955.6
It has also been contended, and some courts have held, that
when the project or activity is itself discretionary there is immunity
for conduct performed in the furtherance of that activity. Thus the
District Court for the Northern District of Florida has found that
it lacked jurisdiction to inquire whether negligence caused the explosion of a strato-jet bomber on a secret experimental mission.7
Another district court refused to examine the negligence of the
Government in maintaining a dangerously rotten tree overhanging
a parking lot, because the tree had been planted experimentally
by the Department of Agriculture. "That being so, the course to be
pursued in experimenting with this tree . . . and determinations to

be made with respect to continuing or terminating such experimentation"8 were the kind of discretionary functions shielded from
liability by section 2680 (a). This position seems to be a variant of
the first one and has presumably fallen with it.9
Another position that seems to be emerging has been described
in a recent district court decision as one that "distinguishes between
acts or omissions arising from the exercise or performance of a discretionary function and those occurring within the scope or area
of the discretionary function but which themselves do not involve
5See, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1954),
rev'd, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954).
GIndian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), reversing 211 F.2d 886
(5th Cir. 1954); United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907, affirming 221 F.2d
62 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See also Air Transp. Associates, Inc. v. United States, 221 F.2d
467 (9th Cir. 1955) (governmental liability based on negligence of control tower
personnel at Air Force base). The Supreme Court reaffirmed its 1955 decisions in
Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 77 Sup. Ct. 374 (1957).
7Williams v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Fla. 1953). Upon the point
in question the court of appeals, although affirming on other grounds, 218 F.2d
473, 475 (5th Cir. 1955), found no evidence to "justify the inference that the particular flight in question was an experimental one and, thus, that the accident was
a natural result of the performance of a discretionary function."

8Toledo v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 838, 841 (D. Puerto Rico 1950). See also
Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (Sth Cir. 1950); Olson v. United States, 93 F.
Supp. 150 (D.N.D. 1950).
9
See Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956); Bulloch v. United
States, 133 F. Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955).
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any proper element of discretion."' 10 But the limits of this position
have not been fully worked out.
A rational basis for determining the existence or nonexistence
of governmental immunity might be the distinction between major
policy decisions necessary in determining whether to enter into a
project, or where to locate it, or what its general outlines and
methods were to be, on the one hand, and the subordinate decisions
that someone would have to make in carrying out the major objectives, on the other. This distinction would be imprecise, but it
would reflect in a general way the need to forestall the intra-governmental conflicts that might be presented if the judiciary were
called upon to review the propriety or wisdom of political or regulatory action by the legislature or the executive. At the same time
this test would have the merit of curtailing liability only in so far
as the need exists.
Some earlier decisions pointed approximately to this test.", In
Dalehite v. United States, 2 the culmination of the famous Texas
City disaster litigation, the problem was presented to the Supreme
Court. Among other things this case involved decisions (I) to ship
ammonium nitrate, long used as a component in explosives, for
fertilizer purposes to our allies after the close of hostilities; (2) to
refrain from further experimentation designed to discover the extent of its dangerously explosive character; and (3) to bag the product at a certain temperature, using a certain type of container, without any warning thereon of possible dangers. In a four-to-three decision the Court held that all these decisions involved the exercise
of a discretionary function:' 3
"[T]he 'discretionary function or duty' . . - includes more

than the initiation of programs and activities. It also indudes determinations made by executives or administrators
loChristenson, J., in Bulloch v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885, 888 (D. Utah
1955).
"'Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951); Maryland for Use of Pumphrey v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.
1949); Smith v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 131 (D. Del. 1953); see Note, 38 MINN.
L. REv. 175 (1954).
12346 U.S. 15 (1953), affirming In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d
771 (5th Cir. 1952) (consolidated suit representing some 8,485 plaintiffs for damages
amounting to $200,000,000).
13Id. at 35.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1957

5

188

Florida Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1957], Art. 3
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations.
Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there
is discretion."

The dissenting minority felt that immunity should not attach to
decisions (2) and (3), which after all involved exactly the kind of
exercise of judgment that private industry must constantly make at
14
the peril of having some later court or jury find it unreasonable.
Nor did the dissenters think it significant, as the majority apparently
did, that the acts and omissions charged as negligent had all received specific approval at a fairly high policy-making level.15
Some water has gone over the dam since the Dalehite case. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently said:16
"It is further worthy of note that the minority in Dalehite,
whose dissent was indicative of the desire to give broad extension to the Tort Claims Act, had become the majority in
Indian Towing Co. A reading of the opinions and the dissents
in the two cases leads to the conclusion that Indian Towing
Co. represents a definite change in attitude on the part of the
Supreme Court."
Other decisions in district courts and courts of appeal reflect
something of the same point of view. It is not at all clear, however,
that Dalehite has been altogether overruled. The present area of
doubt concerns those operational details that have been specifically
approved at higher policy-making levels. Some of the more recent
decisions will illustrate this doubt. In Fair v. United States" an
Air Force captain who was released from a base hospital after cursory psychiatric examination shot plaintiff's decedent, whom he had
JAMES, ToRTs §28.3 (1956).
IsCompare "The decisions . . . were all responsibly made at a planning rather

14See 2 HARPER and

than operational level," 346 U.S. at 42, with "if decisions are being made at
Cabinet levels as to the temperature of bagging explosive fertilizers .... and how
the bags should be labeled, perhaps an increased sense of caution and responsibility
even at that height would be wholesome," id. at 58. See also Boyce v. United
States, 93 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Iowa 1950) (cited with approval by the majority in
Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36, n.32), in which the size of charges to be used in blasting
was described by detailed plans approved by the Army Chief of Engineers; the
Government was held to be immune from liability in that respect.
16Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288, 292 (5th Cir. 1956).

17234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956).
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previously threatened. Negligence was charged in releasing him
with knowledge of his homicidal tendencies, without adequate psychiatric examination or observation and without notifying decedent
of his release after an agreement to do so. The court reversed a
judgment dismissing the complaint, saying that the Government's
liability "is measured by the same rules as the local law applies to
a private employer under like circumstances,"' I s even though its
employees are "vested with a measure of discretion." The court
did, however, note that the discretion was exercised on the operational and not the planning level. In making the challenged decisions "the doctors were on their own."'19
In Dahlstrom v. United States20 the Civil Aeronautics Authority
had decided to establish an instrument approach pattern for the
airport at Alexandria, Minnesota, by means of low level flights
with a twin-engine plane. The pilots in carrying out these orders
frightened the plaintiff's horses while they were being used in an
open field. The pilots had not seen the plaintiff or the horses. The
court assumed that the matters specifically covered by the CAA's
decisions fell within the exercise of a discretionary function, but
that in taking precautions the pilots "were on their own," 2' so that
there would be no immunity for any negligence in that regard.
The question has also come up in two recent decisions concerning the alleged injurious consequences of nuclear blasts. In
Bulloch v. United States2 2 the district court said that, if failure to
give notice of impending detonations resulted from "a discretionary
decision at any level that such notice would be impractical or
would interfere with the carrying out of the project or would involve wasted -time without justification," the court might not be
permitted to weigh the reasonableness of this decision. On the
other hand, negligence could properly be predicated on a negligent failure - presumably through mere oversight - to do what
ordinary care would require. Another district court held that a
choice, made by experts in the field, of the location of certain testing devices constituted the exercise of a discretionary function, so
that the court would not review its reasonableness.23
18id.at

294.
191d. at 293.

20228 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956).
'211d. at 823.

F. Supp. 885, 889 (D. Utah 1955).
23Barthblomae C6rp. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
22133
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What these decisions mean, in sum, is that the victims of the
Government's negligent mistakes must still bear the burden of
them as long as the mistakes are those in judgment made or ratified on the planning level.24 Since specifications as to operations
are often approved in more or less detail at a quite high level, this
is a serious limitation; and the Government has it in its power to
make it more serious by the simple device of requiring higher echelon approval for more details.
This carries immunity a great deal further than is needed to
shield political and regulatory decisions from inappropriate judicial
review. Most of the discretionary decisions involved in the cases
discussed have their near analogies - often their exact analogies in private enterprise. In that field there is a handful of older cases
that shielded the businessman's judgment from the consequence of
liability. In Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Groeger25 it was held that
determination of the type of plugs to be installed in the crown
plate of a steam locomotive boiler was a matter entrusted to the
judgment or discretion of management and was not for a court
or jury to question.26 But decisions like this have not prevailed.
The discretion of private enterprise is now fully reviewable by the
judiciary.2 - As government activity becomes more extensive and
more dangerous the analogous nonpolitical judgments that it entails should also be reviewable. If the courts will not themselves
assume this duty, the discretionary function provision of section
2680 (a) should be redefined or repealed entirely.
24See the most recent expression of the Supreme Court, though perhaps not in
the same connection, to the effect that "Congress was aware that when losses caused
by [negligence in fire fighting] are charged against the public treasury they are
in effect spread among all those who contribute financially to the support of the
Government and the resulting burden on each taxpayer is relatively slight. But
when the entire burden falls on the injured party it may leave him destitute or
grievously harmed. Congress could, and apparently did, decide that this would
be unfair when the public as a whole benefits from the services performed by

Government employees." Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 77 Sup. Ct. 874, 377 (1957).
25266 U.S. 521 (1925).
26The Court said: "If the question . . . were one for the determination of a
jury, we think there was evidence which would sustain a verdict in the affirmative
Comparative
or in the negative. But . . . the question was not for the jury ....
merits as to safety or utility are most difficult to determine. It is not for the courts
to lay down rules which will operate to restrict the carriers in their choice of
mechanical means by which their locomotives, boilers, engine tenders and appurtenances are to be kept in condition." 266 U.S. at 530.
27See in general 2 HARPER and JAMEs, ToRTs cc. XVII, XXVIII (1956).
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